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No. 00-56444
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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THE LINCOLN CLUB OF ORANGE COUNTY, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
CITY OF IRVINE, CALIFORNIA,
Defendant/Appellee
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ON APPEAL FROM THE U. S. DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
_______________________________________________________
APPLICATION OF PROPOSED AMICUS CURIAE
AIRPORT WORKING GROUP POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE TO FILE BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF APPELLANT LINCOLN CLUB'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
_______________________________________________________
Charles H. Bell, Jr. (CSB 060553)
Thomas W. Hiltachk (CSB 131215)
BELL, McANDREWS, HILTACHK & DAVIDIAN, LLP
455 Capitol Mall, Suite 801
Sacramento CA 95814
Telephone: (916) 442-7757
Facsimile: (916) 442-7759
Attorneys for Proposed Amicus Curiae
Airport Working Group Political Action Committee
APPLICATION TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Airport Working Group Political Action Committee ("Amicus")
is a California-registered recipient campaign committee, formed
pursuant to California Government Code section 82013(a), organized
to support candidates for state and local offices via contributions
and "independent expenditures." Amicus is domiciled in
and is active primarily in Orange County. Amicus has a particular
interest in the outcome of this litigation, as has in the past received
contributions to make independent expenditures, and may in the future
consider accept contributions to make independent expenditures not
only in the City of Irvine but also in other cities within Orange
County that have adopted similar restrictions and prohibitions upon
independent expenditure activity. Amicus also is concerned that
it has been, and would continue to be, unable to associate with
others to make independent expenditures, and the principal rationale
for the ordinance (in the guise of "leveling the playing field")
seeks to suppress associational and speech rights.
Amicus believes the challenged ordinance is an unconstitutional
expenditure limit unjustified by the asserted governmental interest
of "preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption."
Application is hereby made to file the attached Amicus Curiae brief
in support of the Lincoln Club of Orange County's Motion for Reconsideration.
Dated: January 10, 2002 Respectfully Submitted,
BELL, McANDREWS, HILTACHK & DAVIDIAN, LLP
By:___________________________
Charles H. Bell, Jr.
Attorneys for Proposed Amicus Curiae Airport Working Group Political
Action Committee
INTRODUCTION
Amicus believes there is no logical or constitutional distinction
to be made between an individual or entity making an independent
expenditure and two or more individuals or entities associating
to do so. The challenged ordinance here constitutes an impermissible,
unconstitutional expenditure limit by substantially impairing the
right of association of separate persons to do together what each
can do separately.
The United States Supreme Court has held in three cases (Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) ("Buckley");
Federal Election Comm. v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) ("NCPAC"); and Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission
518 U.S. 604, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (1996)("Colorado I") that
independent expenditures do not present the problem of corruption
or potential corruption in the form of quid pro quo arrangement
or coordination of a political benefit with a candidate. The logic
of the Court's analyses is unassailable. Irvine and others - including
the respondent Federal Election Commission in these three cases
- have asserted that the potential for corruption exists where a
candidate benefitted by an independent expenditure has knowledge
of the identity of the spender. The Supreme Court has rejected that
premise for good reason: sunshine disclosure laws have been lauded
for serving as disinfectants in the public square, not contaminants.
Irvine's "contamination" theory is bereft of any evidentiary
support. Moreover, the record in this case is clear that Irvine's
intention in enacting the challenged ordinance was only to limit
such activity in order to "level the playing field," an
impermissible and non-compelling governmental interest. This interest
has not justified governmental suppression of speech for good reason:
"leveling the playing field" protects incumbents and stifles
discussion of public issues by groups and organizations such as
the Amicus.
It is beyond cavil that there is no distinction between public knowledge
of the identity of an independent spender and public knowledge of
the identities of contributors to an independent expenditure committee
that would justify restricting the latter when the former cannot
be regulated or restricted.
For these reasons, Lincoln Club's motion for reconsideration of
this Court's decision should be granted and the requested revision
of the court's opinion should be adopted.
I. The Challenged Ordinance Irrationally Interferes With Associational
and Speech Interests of Persons or Entities That Cannot Do Together
What Each May Do Separately
As The Lincoln Club has pointed out, in Irvine municipal elections,
wealthy candidates may contribute an unlimited amount of money to
their own campaigns, and the record evidence below showed that candidates
have in the past contributed upwards of $50,000 dollars to their
own campaigns. Irvine Municipal Code § 1-2-404(A). Similarly,
wealthy individuals may expend an unlimited amount of their own
funds in independent expenditures advocating the election or defeat
of Irvine municipal candidates. Joint Statement of Uncontroverted
Facts ("JS") 14 (ER 33).
Moreover, individuals or entities may make unlimited independent
expenditures, a right protected by the Constitution. (Buckley v.
Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, 47.) But if two or more people of more
modest means decide to pool their resources in order to make independent
expenditures in those same elections, Irvine Municipal Code §
1-2-404(B) prohibits them from contributing more than $320 each
to that collaborative effort. Similarly, other Orange County cities,
such as the City of Orange, prohibit such contributions to committees
making independent expenditures in municipal elections in a similar
way. (See, e.g., Orange Municipal Code §§2.10.050A, 2.10.050C.)
The Supreme Court in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
v. Federal Election Commission, supra, following both Buckley and
NCPAC, noted the "attenuated, at best" connection between
contributions to a political party and potential corruption of candidates
supported by that political party:
"We recognize that FECA permits individuals to contribute more
money ($20,000) to a party than to a candidate ($1,000) or to other
political committees ($5,000). 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a). We also
recognize that FECA permits unregulated "soft money" contributions
to a party for certain activities, such as electing candidates for
state office, see § 431(8)(A)(i), or for voter registration
and "get out the vote" drives, see § 431(8)(B)(xii).
But the opportunity for corruption posed by these greater opportunities
for contributions is, at best, attenuated." (518 U.S. at p.
615.)
The Court then discussed at some length the reasons such corruption
was so attenuated in such circumstances, concluding:
"But we do not believe that the risk of corruption present
here could justify the "markedly greater burden on basic freedoms
caused by" the statute's limitations on expenditures. Buckley,
424 U.S., at 44, 96 S.Ct., at 646-647. See also id., at 46-47, 51,
96 S.Ct., at 647-648, 650; NCPAC, supra, at 498, 105 S.Ct., at 1469."
(518 U.S. at p. 617.)
The Court then discussed how a person could legally spend more than
he or she could contribute to a candidate via independent expenditures,
observing that associated contributions to an independent expenditure
committee such as a political party might actually lessen or further
attenuate the potential corrupting influence of such contributions:
"Contributors seeking to avoid the effect of the $1,000 contribution
limit indirectly by donations to the national party could spend
that same amount of money (or more) themselves more directly by
making their own independent expenditures promoting the candidate.
See Buckley, supra, at 44-48, 96 S.Ct., at 646-649 (risk of corruption
by individuals' independent expenditures is insufficient to justify
limits on such spending). If anything, an independent expenditure
made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed
by a party rather than the donor, would seem less likely to corrupt
than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly
by that donor. In any case, the constitutionally significant fact,
present equally in both instances, is the lack of coordination between
the candidate and the source of the expenditure. See Buckley, supra,
at 45-46, 96 S.Ct., at 647-648; NCPAC, supra, at 498, 105 S.Ct.,
at 1469. This fact prevents us from assuming, absent convincing
evidence to the contrary, that a limitation on political parties'
independent expenditures is necessary to combat a substantial danger
of corruption of the electoral system. (Id., at pp. 618-619.)
In National Conservative Political Action Committee v. Federal
Election Commission, supra, striking Federal Election Campaign
Act limitations on independent expenditures by political committees,
the Court, citing Buckley's language, commented about the corruption
rationale:
"It is of course hypothetically possible here, as in the case
of the independent expenditures forbidden in Buckley, that candidates
may take notice of and reward those responsible for PAC expenditures
by giving official favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting
messages. But here, as in Buckley, the absence of prearrangement
and coordination undermines the value of the expenditure to the
candidate, and thereby alleviates the danger that expenditures will
be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.
On this record, such an exchange of political favors for uncoordinated
expenditures remains a hypothetical possibility and nothing more."
(470 U.S. at p. 497.)
Similarly, in this case, nothing in the record supports any contention
by Irvine that contributions to independent expenditure committees
are corrupting or present the possibility of corruption.
II. Heightened Scrutiny is Appropriate and Justifies the Determination
That the Irvine Ordinance Unconstitutionally Interferes With Protected
Association and Speech Interests
The ordinance was properly analyzed under a strict scrutiny analysis.
(Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 571 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Day
v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1365 (8th Cir. 1994)), cert. denied, 119
S.Ct. 510 (1998)). Based upon such scrutiny, the ordinance should
be invalidated. (Arkansas Right to Life State Political Action Comm.
v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 544-46 (W.D. Ark. 1998); see also
Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Buckley, 60 F. Supp.
2d 1066, 1075-76 (D. Colo. 1999) (subjecting restriction on contributions
to committees making candidate-related expenditures to strict scrutiny,
citing, inter alia, Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 295-296, 102 S.Ct. 434, 436-437, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981;
Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174
(10th Cir. Dec. 26, 2000)[applied less than strict scrutiny].)
As noted above, in the particular facts of this case, the Irvine
ordinance prohibits The Lincoln Club from making any independent
expenditures. Hence, analysis of the ordinance as an unconstitutional
expenditure limitation is appropriate. Thus, the effect of the Irvine
ordinance is therefore more than just a restriction on expenditures;
it is an outright prohibition, in the circumstances presented here,
and as such is subject to strict scrutiny. (See, e.g., Federal Election
Comm. v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., supra, 470
U.S. at p. 498.)
Amicus believes that any restriction upon contributions to an independent
expenditure committee constitutes an unwarranted expenditure limitation.
There is no logical or constitutional distinction to be made between
an individual or entity making an independent expenditure and two
or more individuals or entities associating to do so. The Supreme
Court in Colorado I acknowledged this fact, in commenting that the
corruption rationale in the case of contributions to a political
party that makes independent expenditures is even more attenuated
than in the case of a single, independent spender. (Colorado I,
supra, 518 U.S. at p. 616.)
The "contribution" versus "expenditure" analysis
and dichotomy is, in Amicus' view, inapplicable to contributions
to independent expenditure committees. As articulated above, the
notion that "contributions" can limited in the absence
of a potentially-corrupting influence on candidates is completely
inapplicable in the independent expenditure arena. Unlike California
Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 2722, 69 L.Ed.2d
567 (1981), here the limitation on contributions to a political
committee that makes independent expenditures does not prevent "evasion
of candidate" contribution limits, for the reasons noted by
the Supreme Court in Colorado I, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 616-618,
discussed above. The only effect of such contribution limits upon
contributions to committees such as The Lincoln Club and Amicus
that regularly make independent expenditures serves is to limit
or prohibit entirely those expenditures.
Moreover, the "proxy speech" analysis of contributions
to political committees, applicable in the case of contributions
to candidates (Buckley, supra) and to political committees that
make contributions to candidates (California Medical Ass'n, supra),
is of limited analytical value when the contributions are made to
a political committee whose primary purpose is to make independent
expenditures. When the contributor knows that his or her contribution
is to be used for an independent expenditure, and associates him
or herself to engage in such activity, the speech is, at the least,
"proxy plus," since the direct purpose of an independent
expenditure is to communicate the viewpoint or viewpoints of the
contributors. The contributor's funds are not used for any other
purpose.
III. Irvine's "Evidence" of a Constitutionally Valid Purpose
Does Not and Cannot Support Irvine's Asserted Purpose
Amicus joins in the The Lincoln Club's argument that Irvine's "evidence"
of a constitutionally-valid purpose does not support Irvine's asserted
governmental purpose in any event. Irvine had no constitutionally
justifiable purpose when it enacted Section 1-2-404(B), or that
at the very least the record evidence demonstrates that there is
no material dispute about Irvine's purpose, especially when that
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to The Lincoln Club.
The record evidence is that Irvine concedes that it was unaware
of any instances of quid pro quo corruption which served as the
basis for the Ordinance at issue here. JS 29 (ER 36). Thus, unlike
the actual examples of corruption that supported the restrictions
on contributions to candidates upheld in Buckley v. Valeo, supra,
424 U.S. 1, the concern with quid pro quo corruption resulting from
contributions to independent expenditure committees that Irvine
has asserted in this litigation is "an illusory one."
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27; see also, NCPAC, 470 U.S. at p. 497.
Irvine's own documents demonstrate conclusively that Irvine's purpose
was to "level the playing field" in Irvine municipal elections,
not to address real or perceived quid pro quo corruption. See ER
47 ("this ordinance comes as close to leveling the field as
we can attain"); ER 42 (descrying the ability of independent
expenditure committees "to disproportionately influence an
election"); id. ("our Ordinance restores the balance of
influence"). This leveling-the-playing-field purpose is the
only purpose actually codified in Irvine's Campaign Financing Law.
See IMC § 1-2-402 (ER 13) (purpose is to "ensure an environment
. . . wherein all candidates for elective office are placed on an
equal plan (sic) relative to the amount of campaign contributions
received by them, and further to ensure that the amount contributed
by any person does not materially influence the outcome of any election").
The Supreme Court in Buckley soundly rejected such a purpose as
grounds for infringing First Amendment rights. 424 U.S. at 48-49;
and Irvine's attempts to generate post-hoc litigation rationalizations
for actions in fact differently grounded are inadmissible.
Amicus also agrees with and joins The Lincoln Club's argument that
Irvine's claim of a purpose to prevent the evasion of existing campaign
finance laws is without foundation. Neither the ordinance's own
stated purpose or anything in the evidentiary record supports such
a claim. Moreover, Amicus has already adverted to the reasons why
the asserted "anti-evasion" purpose is inapplicable in
the case of contributions to independent expenditure committees.
The anti-evasion purpose that has been recognized is merely a corollary
to the anti-corruption purpose: Such restrictions on contributions
to committees that in turn contribute to candidates have been upheld
in order to prevent contributors from evading the candidate contribution
limits by funneling additional funds to the candidates through the
intermediary committees. California Medical Ass'n., 453 U.S. at
199 [limitation on contributions to multi-candidate committees was
"an appropriate means by which Congress could seek to protect
the integrity of the contribution restrictions upheld by [the] Court
in Buckley" (emphasis added)]. The Irvine ordinance at issue
here restricts only contributions to independent expenditure committees,
which by definition do not funnel contributions to candidates. See
Cal. Govt. Code § 82031. Limitations on independent expenditures
are unconstitutional. NCPAC, supra, 470 U.S. at 498; Buckley, supra,
424 U.S. at 47.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Amicus respectfully urges this court
to grant The Lincoln Club's motion for reconsideration and modify
its opinion and order accordingly.
Dated: January 10, 2002 Respectfully Submitted,
BELL, McANDREWS, HILTACHK & DAVIDIAN, LLP
By: _____________________________ Charles H. Bell, Jr.
Attorneys for Proposed Amicus Curiae Airport Working Group Political
Action Committee
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