Daniel P. Collins*
In Lewis v. Casey, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (1996), the Supreme Court demonstrated
how basic structural limitations on federal judicial power--such
as standing requirements--can serve to protect the States from unwarranted
federal interference in their governance.
In Lewis, 22 inmates incarcerated in various Arizona state prisons
filed a class action suit claiming that the State was depriving
them of their right of access to the courts under Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817 (1977). Bounds had held that this right of access "requires
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing
of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law." Id. at 828. The district court construed Bounds's holding
as giving it the authority to engage in a wide-ranging review of
the adequacy of Arizona's prison law libraries, and at the end of
a three-month bench trial, the court ruled that Arizona's system
failed to satisfy constitutional requirements.
The district court concluded that Arizona's prison libraries had
inadequately trained staff, failed to update their legal materials,
and had insufficient photocopying facilities. 116 S.Ct. at 2177-78.
The court concluded that Arizona particularly failed to provide
adequate legal assistance to "lockdown prisoners"--inmates
who had been removed from the general prison population because
of their dangerousness--and illiterate and non-English-speaking
inmates. Id. at 2178. After appointing a special master to recommend
appropriate relief, the district court proceeded to enter a remedial
order the sheer arrogance of which almost surpasses belief. As described
in Justice Thomas' concurring opinion, the court's order left "no
stone unturned":
It covers everything from training in legal research to the ratio
of typewriters to prisoners in each facility. It dictates the hours
of operation for all prison libraries statewide, without regard
to inmate use, staffing, or cost. It guarantees each prisoner a
minimum two-hour visit to the library per trip, and allows the prisoner,
not prison officials, to determine which reading room he will use.
The order tells [Arizona] the types of forms it must use to take
and respond to prisoner requests for materials. It requires all
librarians to have an advanced degree in library science, law, or
paralegal studies. ... The order goes so far as to dictate permissible
noise levels in law library reading rooms and requires the State
to "take all necessary steps, and correct any structural or
acoustical problems."
Id. at 2199. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit left this stunning order
essentially undisturbed.
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed
the district court's injunction, for two separate reasons. In a
portion of the opinion joined by eight members of the Court (Justice
Stevens was the lone dissenter), the Court held that the district
court's "wildly intrusive" injunction "failed to
accord adequate deference to the judgment of the prison authorities."
Id. at 2185. But in a separate section joined by only five Justices,
the Court identified a more fundamental defect in the district court's
order: the particular plaintiffs before the district court "lacked
standing to complain of injuries to non-English speakers and lockdown
prisoners," and the minimal showing of injury with respect
to illiterate prisoners--while sufficient for standing purposes--could
not support the systemwide relief ordered by the district court.
Id. at 2183-84 & nn. 6 & 7.
In explaining this aspect of its decision, the Court began by noting
that the doctrine of standing, by requiring a showing of "actual
injury" before judicial relief may be afforded, "prevents
courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches."
Id. at 2179. The Court further elaborated on the importance of standing
rules in ensuring that federal courts stay within their proper bounds
in our constitutional system:
It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual
or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer,
actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of the political
branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion
as to comply with the laws and the Constitution. ... [T]he distinction
between the two roles would be obliterated if, to invoke intervention
of the courts, no actual or imminent harm were needed, but merely
the status of being subject to a governmental institution that was
not organized or managed properly.
Id. at 2179.
In applying this standing requirement of actual injury, the Supreme
Court held that the district court had lost sight of "the right
to which the actual or threatened harm must pertain." Id. at
2179. "Because Bounds did not create an abstract, free-standing
right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish
relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's
law library or legal assistance program is sub-par in some theoretical
sense." Id. at 2180. Rather, because the right involved in
Bounds was the right of access to courts, a plaintiff "must
go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings
in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts
to pursue a legal claim." Id. The Court acknowledged that certain
language in Bounds might be read "to suggest that the State
must enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate
effectively once in court," but the Court specifically disavowed
those statements. Id. at 2181 (emphasis in original). Moreover,
to establish a Bounds violation, the claim hindered must be one
that attacks a sentence or conviction or that challenges conditions
of confinement. Id. at 2181-82.
Applying these standards, the Court concluded that the district
court's factual findings established only two instances of "actual
injury": one illiterate inmate had a case dismissed with prejudice
and another illiterate inmate in a separate prison was unable to
file a legal action. Id. at 2182. The fact that only illiterate
inmates had established actual injury meant that, right off the
bat, the district court had erred in adopting injunctive provisions
"directed at special services or special facilities required
by non-English-speakers, by prisoners in lockdown, and by the inmate
population at large." Id. at 2183. The standing rules thus
ensured that the mere fact that a plaintiff had "demonstrated
harm from one particular inadequacy in government administration"
would not permit the courts "to remedy all inadequacies in
that administration." Id. (emphasis in original). (The district
court's broad, systemwide relief for illiterate prisoners was invalid,
not because of lack of standing, but because the two isolated instances
that provided standing "were a patently inadequate basis for
a conclusion of systemwide violation and imposition of systemwide
relief." Id. at 2184.)
Lewis reminds us that doctrines such as standing, far from being
mere procedural hurdles, are vital structural protections that serve
to prevent federal courts from running completely amok and intruding
into matters that are properly the responsibilities of the States
or the political branches of the federal government. Put simply,
the district court in Lewis overlooked the fact that "[t]he
Constitution charges federal judges with deciding cases and controversies,
not with running state prisons." Id. at 2186 (Thomas, J., concurring).
*Dan Collins is Vice Chairman for Publications, Federalism and
Separation of Powers Practice Group. He is an Associate at Munger,
Tolles & Olson, Los Angeles.
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