Thomas P. Vartanian, Robert H. Ledig and Alisa Babitz*
The Fifth and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have each recently
issued opinions which are relevant to fair lending litigation. In
each case, the appellate court reversed a lower court of agency
ruling that the defendant(s) had illegally discriminated against
the plaintiff(s) and the award of monetary damages to the plaintiff(s).
The decision provides important guidance as to the standards these
circuits will apply in cases involving allegations of discrimination
under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") based on a theory of
disparate impact.
In Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, the Fifth Circuit reversed a
decision by the district court that First Gibraltar Bank's ("Gibraltar")
refusal to issue a commitment letter to refinance its existing loan
on the plaintiff's property constituted intentional discrimination
based on race and had a disparate impact on minorities in violation
of the FHA. Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83F.3rd 1546 (5th Cir.
1996). The district court had awarded $1.21 million in compensatory
damages and $2 million in punitive damages to the plaintiff, a white
landlord. The plaintiff alleged that Gibraltar refused to issue
the commitment letter because it did not want to issue a loan to
a co-op that was in a minority area and would probably be minority
owned.
The Fifth Circuit held that because the plaintiff presented no
evidence that race was a factor in Gibraltar's refusal to give him
the commitment letter, a jury could not reasonably infer that race
a was significant factor in Gibraltar's decision and that the bank
had intentionally discriminated against him. The plaintiff also
alleged that Gibraltar's denial of his application had a disparate
impact on minorities because almost all of the prospective owners
of the cooperative units were minorities and the cooperative project
would have benefited the predominantly minority community in which
it was located. However, the Fifth Circuit stated that "[t]he
relevant question in a discriminatory effects claim against a private
defendant, however, is not whether a single act or decision by the
defendant has a significantly greater impact on members of a protected
class, but instead the question is whether a policy, procedure,
or practice specifically identified by the plaintiff has a significantly
greater discriminatory impact on members of a protected class."
Because the plaintiff failed to identify any such policy, procedure
or practice, the Fifth Circuit held that he did not present sufficient
evidence to establish a violation of the FHA under a discriminatory
effects theory.
In Pfaff v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of an Administrative Law Judge
(an "ALJ") finding that the defendants' facially neutral
numerical occupance restriction illegally discriminates against
families with children. Pfaff v. U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 15770 (9th Cir, 1996). The
ALJ had awarded approximately $24,000 in compensatory damages and
assessed a civil penalty of $8,000 against the defendants, who are
private landlords. The Ninth Circuit held that the Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") had acted arbitrarily
and capriciously when it brought an enforcement action against the
defendants and the HUD ALJ required them to prove that their numerical
occupance limit was a "compelling business necessity,"
and to show that this limit was the least restrictive means to achieve
that end.
The compelling business necessity standard was announced by the
Secretary of HUD in HUD v. Mountain Side Mobile Estates, 2 Fair
Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 25.053 (HUD Sec'y, July 19, 1993) but
ultimately rejected by the Tenth Circuit, which ruled instead that
a defendant must demonstrate that the allegedly discriminatory practice
has a "manifest relationship" to the housing in question.
Mountain Side Mobile Estates v. HUD, 56 F.3rd 1243 (10th Cir. 1995).
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in this instance, rejected
the compelling business necessity standard, concluding the HUD's
application of this standard was an abrupt departure from previous
statements that occupancy requirements based on factors such as
the number of bedrooms in a dwelling unit would be judged against
a "reasonableness" standard. The Ninth Circuit also criticized
HUD for failing to provide guidance adequate to enable the public
to comply with the Fair Housing Act.
As attention continues to be focused on fair lending issues, lenders
are increasingly likely to be faced with claims that facially neutral
practices that are used in their loan underwriting process have
a disparate impact on a particular protected group or groups, a
form of proof that has been widely interpreted not to require any
showing of intent. The Simms, Pfaff and Mountainside cases indicate
that Courts of Appeals appear inclined to look carefully at the
standards used to support such claims of discrimination in the absence
of direct evidence or an inference of an intent to illegally discriminate
among loan applicants.
* Messrs. Vartanian and Ledig are partners and Ms. Babitz is an
associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson. Mr. Vartanian was formerly General Counsel
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and is a member of the Advisory
Board of the Electronic Banking Law and Commerce Report. The authors
are co-authors of a recently published book, The Fair Lending Guide.
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