Paul Clement*
"Abolish diversity," has long been a rallying cry among
some Washington conservatives. The object of their outrage is not
the stated justification for some modern race-based quota, but a
basis for federal-court jurisdiction as old as the nation. Despite
the historical pedigree of federal diversity jurisdiction, many
conservatives have argued that it has outlived its usefulness --
that state courts enjoy comparative expertise in adjudicating claims
arising under state law, and that federal courts should be reserved
for federal questions. What is more, it is argued that the elimination
of diversity jurisdiction would have the salutary benefit of reducing
the caseload of federal judges. While skeptics of the value of diversity
jurisdiction have not yet succeeded in securing its elimination,
on several occasions Congress has raised the amount in controversy
requirement.
In the face of this general skepticism of diversity jurisdiction,
Michael Wallace, in the Fall issue of this newsletter, offered an
intriguing proposal that, far from abandoning diversity jurisdiction,
warmly embraced it and proposed its expansion. Specifically, Mr.
Wallace suggested dropping the requirement of complete diversity
(no defendant may share the citizenship of any plaintiff), which
has long been required by statute, see Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 2
L. Ed. 435 (1806), but never mandated by the Constitution, see State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967). Instead,
Wallace would require only minimal diversity (federal jurisdiction
as long as any defendant's citizenship differs from that of any
plaintiffs) in cases of removal. Diversity jurisdiction, therefore,
is expanded under Wallace's proposal when the out-of-state defendant
seeks removal, so that the plaintiff cannot choose to sue in federal
court in the first instance in the absence of complete diversity.
This is a substantial expansion of federal jurisdiction: Diversity
jurisdiction would be available to any defendant sued outside its
home state as long as the existing amount in controversy requirement
($75,000) was satisfied.
In defending the proposed move from complete diversity to minimal
diversity, Wallace observes that the behavior of both plaintiffs
and defendants suggests that plaintiffs enjoy perceived benefits
in at least some state courts in some cases. The tendencies of plaintiffs
to go to great lengths to join in-state co-defendants and of out-of-state
defendants to concoct innovative theories of removal are otherwise
difficult to explain. Wallace then points out that the Constitution
authorizes diversity jurisdiction precisely to remedy the perception
or reality that state courts may discriminate against out-of-state
defendants. Moving away from the statutory complete diversity requirement,
in Wallace's view, would further the purposes of diversity jurisdiction
by providing more out-of-state defendants with a federal forum.
Wallace goes further in arguing that to the extent that the perception
that out-of-state defendants receive unfavorable treatment in state
courts reflects a reality of discrimination, rather than just its
appearance, expanding diversity jurisdiction also would accomplish
procedurally some of the goals that tort reform proposals attempt
to achieve substantively.
Wallace is certainly on to something when he highlights the unfairness
of denying a federal forum to an out-of-state defendant solely because
of the presence of an in-state co-defendant who was joined precisely
to deny the out-of-state defendant the option of removal. Such situations
suggest the weakness of the complete diversity requirement as the
sole criterion for federal diversity jurisdiction. If as a policy
matter we believe that out-of-state defendants deserve the option
of a federal forum, it is difficult to understand why they should
lose that option because of the presence of another party who just
happens to be on the same side of the "v." This is especially
true in the many cases in which the in-state co-defendant may well
have a greater community of interest with the in-state plaintiff
than with the out-of-state defendant. Certainly the presence of
a nominal in-state defendant does little to ameliorate any perception
of unfairness on the part of the out-of-state defendant. Nonetheless,
with the complete diversity requirement, the in-state defendant's
presence consigns the out-of-state defendant to life in state court.
Wallace's recommendation, however, does have one major, perhaps
fatal, flaw: By removing the complete diversity requirement without
altering the amount in controversy, Wallace's proposal would vastly
expand the size of the federal courts' diversity caseload. At a
time when many people from all sides of the political debate are
concerned about the expanding jurisdiction and workload of federal
courts, a proposal to expand diversity jurisdiction may well be
a non-starter. Indeed, a number of people would grant Wallace's
premise that the complete diversity requirement arbitrarily discriminates
against certain out-of-state defendants, but draw the opposite conclusion.
Conceding that it makes little sense to treat an out-of-state defendant
differently based solely on the presence or absence of a nominal
in-state defendant, they would argue that the proper way to ensure
equal treatment is to abandon diversity jurisdiction altogether.
They would no doubt point to the resulting decline in federal court
caseload as the main advantage of such a proposal.
Between these two extremes, there is another option that would
accomplish many of the same objectives as the Wallace proposal,
but would leave the current size of the federal courts' diversity
docket unchanged. This proposal would involve simultaneously increasing
the current amount in controversy requirement from its current $75,000
level to say $250,000, and then imposing a new higher amount in
controversy level of say $5,000,000, beyond which the traditional
requirement of complete diversity would be waived. The numbers could
be adjusted to ensure that the number of diversity suits stays constant
(or the two amount in controversy requirements could be adjusted
to increase or decrease the number of diversity suits).
Lifting the complete diversity requirement only for suits above
a relatively high dollar amount has two distinct advantages over
simply moving to a minimal diversity requirement. First, and most
obviously, it does not add to the caseload of the federal courts.
What is more, it concentrates limited federal court resources on
the types of cases out-of-state defendants fear the most. Relative
to the status quo, this proposal substitutes cases with an in-state
co-defendant with more than $5,000,000 on the line for cases with
complete diversity and less than $250,000 at risk. I would venture
to guess that given the Hobson's choice, most defendants would rather
be in the latter situation and would choose to remove the former
to federal court if they could only remove one. Accordingly, providing
the added assurance of a federal forum in high stakes, minimal diversity
cases better allocates scarce federal judicial resources.
But even beyond holding the line on the expansion of the federal
court workload and concentrating federal jurisdiction where it is
needed (or at least desired) the most, there is an additional benefit
to the adoption of a high upper limit beyond which the complete
diversity requirement is relaxed. Mr. Wallace markets his proposal
as achieving a measure of tort reform. However, for this claimed
benefit to hold true, it is not enough for out-of-state defendants
to harbor the perception that they are disadvantaged in state court.
There must be a reality of discrimination as well as a perception.
There may well be such a reality, and its existence would certainly
vindicate the framers' provision of federal jurisdiction in cases
of diversity of citizenship. Moreover, as Wallace points out, it
shows no disrespect for the vast majority of fair and efficient
state courts to claim, as he does, that certain plaintiffs are adept
at finding courts that are neither. But nonetheless, premising a
policy on the admission of a reality of disparate treatment may
prove difficult, particularly for many conservatives who have argued
that there is a fundamental parity in the quality of justice in
state and federal courts in other contexts, such as habeas review.
To the extent there is actual discrimination against out-of-state
defendants in state court, the proposed two-tiered diversity structure
and Wallace's proposal both provide relief (although Wallace's proposal
would provide relief to more defendants because it would put more
cases in federal court). The key point is that the two-tiered proposal
outlined above would achieve a degree of tort reform even if there
is only a perception of discrimination against out-of-state defendants
in state court.
As long as some plaintiffs who perceive an advantage to staying
in state court tailor their complaint to limit the amount in controversy
to avoid removal to federal court, the proposal will achieve some
tort reform benefits whether or not the plaintiffs' perceived advantages
of staying out of federal court turn out to be true in reality.
Just as some plaintiffs today go to considerable lengths to name
an in-state co-defendant to ensure that their complaint is "removal-proof,"
it seems likely that some plaintiffs would take the additional step
of limiting the amount sought in their pleading to avoid the possibility
of removal.
To be sure, only a relatively small number of plaintiffs will tailor
their complaints to avoid the possibility of removal. The legitimate
amount in controversy would need to be in the ballpark of the upper
limit, and there would need to be an in-state defendant involved
in the case before the upper limit would even enter a plaintiff's
calculus. However, there are reported cases of plaintiffs seeking
to recover amounts less than their actual damages to avoid much
lower amount in controversy requirements. See, e.g., Rocket Oil
& Gas Co. v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 435 F. Supp. 1306 (1977)
(removal denied because plaintiff sought judgment for $9, 858.13);
Erwin v. Allied Van Lines, 239 F. Supp. 144 (1965) (removal denied
because plaintiff sought judgment for exactly $10,000). Moreover,
the Supreme Court has had occasion to observe that: "If [the
plaintiff] does not desire to try his case in the federal court
he may resort to the expedient of suing for less than the jurisdiction
amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more, the defendant
cannot remove." St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938). Accordingly, in light of the latitude
that plaintiffs generally have in pleading for an amount of punitive
damages, such an upper limit might work much like a punitive damages
cap in some cases. This affect along with the perceived or actual
benefit to out-of-state defendants involved in cases with an amount
at risk in excess of the upper limit make this two-tiered proposal
worth considering as a modest effort toward reform of the civil
justice system.
Many of the advantages of this proposed two-tiered system could
be achieved by waiving the requirement of complete diversity for
all diversity suits while raising the amount in controversy requirement
substantially, say to $2,500,000, to keep the total number of federal
diversity suits constant. Such an approach would be closest to the
spirit of Mr. Wallace's original proposal while still maintaining
the current federal-court workload. However, favoring this proposal
over the two-tiered system suggested above requires accepting unequivocally
the arguments that the presence of an in-state defendant is irrelevant
and that the amount in controversy is the only relevant criterion
for allocating the scarce resource of federal diversity jurisdiction.
The two-tiered proposal, on the other hand, recognizes that both
the presence of an in-state defendant and the amount in controversy
are relevant factors. Rather than accepting that the presence of
an in-state co-defendant is irrelevant to whether the out-of-state
defendant will be the victim of real or perceived discrimination,
the two-tiered approach recognizes that, all other factors being
equal, the presence of an in-state co-defendant provides some protection
to an out-of-state defendant.
Therefore, under the two-tiered proposal, if there is too little
at stake, federal jurisdiction would be denied even in the absence
of an in-state co-defendant (just as it is in the status quo). If
there is a great deal at risk, federal jurisdiction would be provided
without regard to the presence of an in-state defendant. But in
between the extremes, the presence of an in-state co-defendant would
be the deciding factor. It is certainly a close call as to whether
a single high amount in controversy requirement for all suits with
minimal diversity is preferable to the two-tiered approach. It strikes
me that the notion that underlies the current statutory requirement
of complete diversity is sufficiently valid to retain the complete
diversity requirement as a factor in some cases, while eliminating
it as a dispositive requirement in all. But both approaches have
advantages over the status quo because they better allocate scarce
judicial resources and provide a modest measure of tort reform to
the extent that plaintiffs purposefully tailor their complaints
to stay under the amount in controversy cap.
If nothing else, considering the proper role of the presence of
in-state co-defendants and the amount in controversy can help continue
the debate started by Mr. Wallace as to how to ration scarce federal
judicial resources most efficiently. Many people may not feel strongly
enough about the usefulness of diversity jurisdiction to expand
it as significantly as Mr. Wallace proposes. But if diversity jurisdiction
is going to be retained, it should certainly be reserved for those
cases where it can provide the most comfort to out-of-state defendants.
The complete diversity requirement is at best a blunt instrument
for accomplishing that objective. And if the move away from the
complete diversity requirement also would provide a measure of tort
reform, then with respect to diversity jurisdiction, it is time
to mend it, not end it.
*Paul Clement is Chief Counsel to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on the Constitution, Federalism & Property Rights. He also serves
as Chairman of the newly formed Class Actions Subcommittee of the
Federalist Society Litigation Practice Group. Michael Wallaces
piece, the subject of this reply, appears in Volume One of Litigation
News (Fall 1997).
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